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COPYRIGHTS-LIMITATIONS oN PROPRIETOR's ExcLusivE RIGHT To
VEND-Plaintiff was the sole proprietor of copyrights on several educational
toys. It had ordered a large number of these toys to be made by defendant
manufacturer, but refused to accept them when tendered, claiming they
were so defective in quality that their sale would impair plaintiff's reputation. When defendant manufacturer began selling the rejected toys to the
co-defendants in order to recover its own investment in them, the plaintiff
obtained a temporary restraining order against all defendants prohibiting
further sales of the toys pending a determination of a motion for permanent injunction. The district court granted a preliminary injunction of
indefinite duration on the ground that the threatened sales might violate
plaintiff proprietor's exclusive right to vend its copyrighted works.1 The
defendants appealed, contending that section 27 of the Copyright Code2
permitted them to sell the goods pursuant to New York state law.3 On
appeal, held, order affirmed with modification to the extent that no injunction issue covering goods which the district court, in a further proceeding, should find the plaintiff was unjustified in rejecting. A proprietor
retains an exclusive right to vend goods embodying his copyrighted conception until he has received a "fair reward." Platt b Munk Co. v. Republic
Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963).
Every copyrighted object is subject to two occasionally inconsistent sets
17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1958).
17 u.s.c. § 27 (1958).
s Defendants primarily relied on N.Y. PERS. PROP. I.Aw § 141, which allows an unpaid
seller to resell the goods in order to mitigate the buyer's damages. This section is practically
identical to UNIPORM 8ALEs Acr § 60. The Court indicated that N.Y. LIEN I.Aw H 180,
200-05, which stipulates certain conditions requited for existence of a lien on peISOnal
property and which qualifies the right of a creditor to sell the goods to satisfy the lien,
were also applicable to the defendant's argument.
1

2
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of legal rules.• The Federal Copyright Code5 has established special rules
to govern copyrighted objects. 6 However, these objects are also subject to
state property law 7 to the extent the latter is not in conflict with the
Federal Copyright Code.8 In the principal case the defendant claimed the
right to sell the copyrighted goods in its possession pursuant to state property law, while the plaintiff attempted to controvert this right by claiming
an exclusive right to sell such goods pursuant to the Copyright Code. Because the validity of state authority to sell the goods depended upon ·the
absence of conflicting copyright law, it was necessary for the court first to
determine with precision the extent of plaintiff's authority, derived from
federal copyright law, to sell the goods in question.
Section l(a) of the Copyright Code9 establishes a comprehensive rule
that the copyright proprietor has the exclusive right to vend all objects
which bear his copyright. However, section 27 of the Code,10 as interpreted
by the House Committee on Patents11 and the courts,12 extinguishes this
exclusive right to vend a particular copy when that copy has once been
sold by the proprietor. This "first sale" limitation on the copyright
proprietor's exclusive right to vend a particular copy has, since its promulgation, received an increasingly liberal interpretation, with the result that
• Comment, Creditors and Copyrights, 12 MERCER L. REv. 239, 243 (1960).
17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963).
U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, gives Congress power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing • • . to authors • • • the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings••••" The word "writings" has been gradually expanded so that it
now includes the design of certain three dimensional utilitarian objects. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924);
LATMAN, HowELL's COPYRIGHT LAw 12-15 (rev. ed. 1962).
7 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 5 (2d ed. 1955).
s The supremacy of the Copyright Code over state property law is derived from U.S.
CoNsr. art. VI: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof • • • shall be the supreme Law of the Land • • • any Thing
in the .•• Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
o ".Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall
have the exclusive right: to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted
work ••••" 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
10 "[B]ut nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the
transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully
obtained." 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1958).
11 "Your committee feels that it would be most unwise to permit the copyright
proprietor to exercise any control whatever over the article which is the subject of copyright after said proprietor has made the first sale.'' (Emphasis added.) H.R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909). Although this interpretation pertains to the Copyright Act
of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084, that section is practically identical with 17 U.S.C. § 27
(1958).
12 See, e.g., Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 517 (3d Cir. 1961); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill &: Co., 61 Fed. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894); United States v. Wells,
176 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D. Tex. 1959). See generally BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY
PROPERTY § 200 (1944). A literal interpretation of § 27 would cause the proprietor's
exclusive right to vend his copyrighted objects to terminate as soon as another merely
acquires lawful physical possession of those copies. However, no court has ever given
§ 27 this interpretation because it is not likely that Congress intended this right to be
destroyed simply because the proprietor permits a manufacturer, shipper, or processor
to handle his goods. Principal case at 851.
IS
6
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it is no longer necessary for the proprietor personally and voluntarily to
execute the sale in order for his exclusive right to vend that copy to be
extinguished. Instead, a "first sale" sufficient to invoke section 27 may be
effected by certain others whom, for various policy reasons, the law has
authorized to execute a binding first sale for the proprietor.18 In the principal case the court attempted to qualify the "first sale" test by announcing
that it would not recognize a first sale by one other than the proprietor unless that sale returned to the proprietor a "fair reward" for the use of his
copyrighted expression in the copies sold.14 Although one of the purposes
of Congress in giving this exclusive right to the copyright proprietor was
to provide him with a feasible way to extract a fair reward for the use of
his copyrighted expression,15 it would seem to be neither accurate nor equitable to assert that section 27 will never operate to limit this right unless the
proprietor receives a fair reward for the use of his expression in the copies
sold.16
In most cases it makes no difference whether the receipt of a "fair
reward" is made an essential prerequisite to finding an "authorized first
sale," because ordinarily when there is a sale of a copyrighted object the
proprietor does receive a fair reward for the use therein of his expression
or design.17 Moreover, use of the "fair reward" criterion does not affect
the outcome in situations where an infringer makes copies of the proprietor's
copyrighted expression and unlawfully sells them to a bona fide purchaser.
In this situation it is apparent that the proprietor has not received any
compensation for the use of his expression in the unauthorized copies.
However, it is also obvious that he has not authorized the sale of the goods;
nor has he conducted himself in a manner which would cause the law to
authorize another to make a "first sale" for him. 18 Consequently, the proprietor retains the exclusive right to vend the copies even though the bona
fide purchaser may hold good title to the physical material comprising the
body of the goods.19 The copyright proprietor, therefore, is able to enjoin
the bona fide purchaser from reselling the offending copies, but he is not
13 See, e.g., Kipling v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 120 Fed. 631 (2d Cir. 1903); Wilder v.
Kent, 15 Fed. 217 (W.D. Pa. 1883).
14 Principal case at 854.
15 See BALL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 46.
16 The court relied exclusively on United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942),
for the promulgation of the "fair reward" test. However, this case involved a patent proprietor rather than a copyright proprietor, and the proprietor, by exercising his exclusive
right to sell a patented object, established a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court frequently qualified the application of the "fair reward" test with the words,
"so far as the Sherman Act is concerned ...." Id. at 279,280.
17 Occasionally a court will use both ideas within a single sentence. Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908).
18 See Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, 27 Fed. 914, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1886).
19 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
952 (1958); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951),
aff'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952). See generally Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent In/ringers
of Copyrights (Study No. 25), in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT I.Aw REVISION STUDIES
(1960).

1964]

RECENT DECISIONS

1257

able to maintain an action in replevin to obtain possession of them because
the Copyright Code does not give him the exclusive right to use or possess
goods protected by his copyright.20
In other situations, however, the case law is difficult to reconcile with a
"fair reward" test. When a copyright proprietor is unwilling or unable to
pay his debts, the court is able to authorize the sheriff to attach and sell the
copyrighted goods for him in order to satisfy his creditors.21 The court in
the principal case reasoned that the proprietor receives a "fair reward'' for
the use of his copyrighted design in this situation, even though he may
receive no direct remuneration from the sale, because he is benefited by the
reduction of his outstanding debts to the extent of the proceeds from the
sale.22 However, this ignores the practical reality that goods sold at a sheriff's
sale seldom bring their fair market value and that it therefore is unlikely
that such a sale really provides the proprietor with a "fair" reward. Nevertheless, the sheriff is authorized to execute a binding first sale for the proprietor.28 This interpretation of section 27 reflects the concern of the law
that a debtor pay his debts even if such payment deprives him of a "fair
reward" for the use of his copyrighted expression.
There is another situation in which the "fair reward" criterion cannot
adequately explain the case law. When a copyright proprietor entrusts his
copyrighted goods to an agent, and the agent, acting within the general
scope of his apparent authority but contrary to instructions, sells them to a
bona fide purchaser, this will probably be held a "first sale" sufficient to
terminate the proprietor's further right to vend the copies, even though
they are sold at a price which returns little or no reward to him for the
use therein of his copyrighted expression.24 Motivated by the policy that in
certain situations the principal ought to be bound by the actions of his
agent when dealing with bona fide purchasers,25 the courts have found the
agent authorized by law to execute the necessary "first sale" for the pro20 See note 9 supra.
21 See WEIL, COPYRIGHT I.Aw 534, 542 (1917); Comment, Creditors and Copyrights, 12

MERCER L. REv. 239, 252-53 (1960); cf. Mcclaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co.,
138 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1943); Wilder v. Kent, 15 Fed. 217 (W.D. Pa. 1883); Wilson v.
Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 515, 24 N.E. 784 (1890). But cf. In re
Progress Lektro Shave Corp., 35 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1940). This should be compared
with Dart v. Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879); Comment, supra at 245-51 where the copyrights are common-law copyrights and not statutory copyrights. In these cases the courts
deny even judicial sales of the copyrighted material, if it is against the proprietor's wishes,
to protect his privacy. With statutory copyrights the proprietor waives his rights to
privacy by publicly registering his conception.
22 Principal case as 854.
23 Cf. Mcclaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493, 499 (3d Cir. 1943);
Wilder v. Kent, 15 Fed. 217, 219 (W.D. Pa. 1883).
24 See Kipling v. G, P. Putnam's Sons, 120 Fed. 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903); cf. Independent
News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961). Contra, Henry Bill Publishing Co. v.
Smythe, 27 Fed. 914 (S.D. Ohio 1886), although there is some evidence that in this case
the court did not believe the new purchasers were actually bona fide purchasers. Id. at 921.
25 See R.l!srATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY§ 175 (1958).

1258

MICHIGAN LAW

REvmw

[Vol.

62

prietor.26 Rather than trying to reconcile this result with the "fair reward"
criterion, the court in the principal case chose to deny that such a sale
would constitute an authorized first sale sufficient to extinguish the pr9prietor's exclusive right to vend those copies.27 However, the court's position
probably represents neither the majority nor the better reasoned rule.
The situation confronting the court in the principal case required further analysis of the authority of others to execute a "first sale" for the
proprietor sufficient to terminate his exclusive right to vend the copies sold.
In order to collect compensation for losses suffered when the plaintiff
allegedly breached a contract to pay for the goods, defendant manufacturer
sought authority to execute a "first sale" for the plaintiff without going
through the judicial procedure necessary to invoke a sheriff's sale. The
court was willing to recognize that the defendant had such authority, but
only if the sale would return a "fair reward" to the proprietor for the use
of its copyrighted design in the goods sold. With reasoning similar to that
applicable to the sheriff's sale situation,28 the court concluded that the
manufacturer's sale would return a "fair reward" to the proprietor only if
the proprietor had actually incurred a liability to the manufacturer against
which the proceeds of the sale could be applied.29 Consequently, the
manufacturer's right to sell the goods arises only if the proprietor is the
party in default. If the proprietor makes a claim in good faith that it is
not the party in default, as in this case, the court will issue an injunction
restraining the sale of the goods until this issue has been determined in a
judicial proceeding. Presumably the proprietor could also contest its liability
after the sale and, should it then prevail, it could collect damages against
the manufacturer for violating its copyright even though it had not sought
an injunction in the first instance.30
Even without reliance upon the "fair reward" theory, the policy justifications for authorizing the manufacturer to make a binding first sale if
the proprietor is in default seem as persuasive as those which prevail in
the sheriff's sale situation discussed earlier.31 If the proprietor is liable to
the manufacturer it seems desirable to provide an expeditious remedy. 32
Permitting the manufacturer to rely on a self-help remedy rather than judicial aid will save time and money for both parties and reduce the likelihood that the copyrighted objects will decline in value before they are
See Authors &: Newspapers Ass'n v. O'Gorman Co., 147 Fed. 616, 619-20 (D.R.I. 1906).
Principal case at 854. The court was probably relying on Henry Bill Publishing Co.
v. Smythe, 27 Fed. 914 (S.D. Ohio 1886). For criticism of that decision, see WEIL, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 538-39. In addition, there is some evidence that the agent did not sell
to a bona fide purchaser there. Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, supra at 921.
28 See notes 21, 23 supra.
29 Principal case at 855.
30 However, it is possible in this situation that the proprietor's actions would estop
him from later suing for violation of his copyright.
31 See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
32 This policy, at least in a non-copyright situation, is clearly evidenced in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-703 and UNIFOR..'\l SALES Ac:r § 60.
26
27

1964]

RECENT DECISIONS

1259

finally sold. This remedy will not unduly deprive the copyright proprietor
of its copyright protection because an injunction can be obtained which
will force the manufacturer to litigate the issue of the proprietor's liability
on the contract by asserting, in good faith, a justification for its refusal to
accept and pay for the goods. Furthermore, the proprietor can probably
still obtain damages for the wrongful invasion of its copyright in a judicial proceeding subsequent to sale if that proceeding should absolve it of
liability on the contract.
Regardless of the court's rationale, the principal case represents a further
recognition of creditors' rights at the expense of the rights of the copyright
proprietor. The step taken is a small one, but it is toward, rather than
away from, more complete justice. The step is small because, should the
copyright proprietor assert in good faith a defense for its refusal to accept
and pay for the goods, an injunction could be obtained to force the manufacturer to a full court proceeding similar to that in the sheriff's sale situation.38
Even if the copyright proprietor should not attempt to enjoin the sale
of the goods, the manufacturer might still prefer to seek a judicial remedy
rather than resort to self-help, because there would remain the danger of
a suit subsequent to the resale in which the manufacturer might ultimately
be proved the party in default on the contract and might be subjected to
substantial liability for violating the proprietor's copyright. However, the
manufacturer may be willing to assume this risk if he feels certain that he
is not the party in default. Furthermore, if the proprietor has no other
substantial assets and the copyrighted goods held by the manufacturer as
security are rapidly declining in value, it seems quite likely that the manufacturer would prefer the risk of violating the proprietor's copyright to the
possibility of a judgment against the proprietor which could not be satisfied.
David M. Ebel

33 See 7 MooRE, FmERAL PRAcrICE 1[ 65.09 (2d ed. 1955).

